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This paper analyses the track record of fiscal forecasts reported by 15 European 
countries in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. For the budget balance, 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and interest payments, we study the statistical 
properties of forecast errors and their politico-institutional determinants. While errors in 
interest and GFCF expenditure present few systematic patterns, budget balance errors 
are responsive to fiscal institutions and to opportunistic motivations, especially from 
1999 onwards: upcoming elections induce over-optimism, whereas commitment or 
mixed forms of fiscal governance and numerical expenditure rules (but not deficit and 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the track record of fiscal forecasts by 15 European Union (EU) 
countries drawing on a previously unexploited data source: the notifications reported 
twice a year in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). We document the 
statistical properties of forecast errors and analyse their economic, political and 
institutional determinants through panel data modelling. The variables under study 
comprise not only the general government budget balance but also two more 
disaggregated items (interest payments and gross fixed capital formation – GFCF). 
 
The use of forecasts is a pervasive feature of fiscal policy. When drafting their budgets, 
governments need a macroeconomic scenario upon which to base revenue projections. 
On the expenditure side, it is also the case that budgetary appropriations often have the 
nature of a forecast – which is particularly clear as regards social transfers and 
entitlement spending in general, but also holds for other items. In the EU, the 
institutional framework for fiscal policy has been a powerful catalyst for the 
dissemination and scrutiny of macroeconomic and budgetary projections: countries 
report current year forecasts in EDP notifications, and medium-term plans in their 
Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs). 
 
Besides their influence on private agents’ expectations and behaviour, fiscal forecasts 
play a prominent role in the assessment of compliance with both the preventive and 
corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Therefore, it is of interest to 
analyse forecasting accuracy, and to address the factors which may help explain forecast 
errors. Recent studies – such as Strauch et al. (2004), Brück and Stephan (2006), Annett 
(2006) or Jonung and Larch (2006) – document the existence of forecast biases in fiscal 
policy formulation, which vary across countries and time and are influenced by political 
considerations (e.g. forthcoming elections) or budgetary institutions (e.g. forms of fiscal 
governance). 
 
Forecasts of fiscal variables are prepared by national governments, international 
organisations and – in some countries – independent institutions, giving rise to several 
different datasets. Artis and Marcellino (2001) analyse forecasts by the IMF, the OECD 
and the European Commission; Brück and Stephan (2006) focus on the latter 
organization; Strauch et al. (2004), Moulin and Wierts (2006) and Annett (2006) resort 
to national SCPs. In this study, we draw on a different source of forecasts: EDP 
notifications. Compared to alternative projections by national governments (i.e. those 
contained in national budgets or in SCPs), EDP data offer the advantages of a larger 
sample and of more uniform statistical definitions and reporting dates. A number of 
recent papers have used this dataset: Mora and Martins (2007) study the magnitude of 
data revisions, i.e. statistical reliability; Koen and van den Noord (2005) and Buti et al. 
(2006) address issues of accounting transparency. While these studies work only with 
fiscal outturns, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyse forecasts from 
the EDP notifications. 
 
Apart from drawing on a new dataset, this paper contains two other innovative 
contributions. First, we consider a larger set of possible determinants of fiscal forecast 
errors, putting together a number of economic and politico-institutional factors that 
1 previous analyses had considered separately, as well as testing the significance of some 
previously unused variables. Second, we do not restrict our attention to the overall 
budget balance, but study some individual spending items as well, namely GFCF and 
interest payments. 
 
We find that, besides reflecting the operation of automatic stabilizers, budget balance 
forecast errors are also responsive to the institutional framework of fiscal policy and to 
opportunistic political motivations. The commitment and mixed forms of fiscal 
governance (Hallerberg, 2004) are associated to more prudent forecasts, and so is the 
reliance on stronger expenditure rules. By contrast, upcoming elections tend to induce 
budget balance forecasts that turn out over-optimistic, especially when the subsequent 
outcomes are reported under a government dominated by the former opposition. These 
institutional and political effects have become stronger since the coming into force of 
the SGP. Forecasts for GFCF and interest payments display better statistical quality than 
their budget balance counterparts, and do not seem to be influenced by most politico-
institutional variables. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
dataset of fiscal forecasts. Section 3 assesses the statistical properties of forecast errors, 
through summary statistics and formal tests of unbiasedness and autocorrelation. 
Section 4 presents an extended set of potential determinants of forecast errors, and 




2. Data  
 
According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3605/93 and in the context of the EDP, EU 
countries must report twice a year to the European Commission a set of public finance 
data including both forecasts and outcomes. These data transmissions, often referred to 
as EDP reportings or notifications, started in March 1994 and have since taken place at 
regular dates, by 1 March and 1 September until 2005, and by 1 April and 1 October 
from 2006 onwards. 
 
EDP notifications include forecasts of the general government nominal budget balance, 
gross debt, interest expenditure and GFCF, as well as of GDP at current market prices, 
for the current year (i.e., year t) and estimates or finalized values of the same variables 
for years t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. Budget balances figures are also to be provided for the 
general government sub-sectors (central, state and local governments, and social 
security funds). Finally, countries also report detailed information on differences 
between public accounts and national accounts data and on stock-flow adjustments.  
 
To our knowledge, this dataset has never been used before to study fiscal forecasting. 
Nevertheless, it presents important advantages over SCPs, hitherto the most widely used 
source of fiscal projections by national governments. First and foremost, EDP 
notifications provide a wider coverage, in particular as regards the 1990s: SCPs only 
started to be submitted on a regular basis in late 1998. Second, they have a higher 
  2standardization of both statistical concepts and reporting dates, thus improving 
comparability both over time and across countries. 
 
One should nonetheless acknowledge the existence of some methodological changes 
since 1994. Most prominently, while all the notifications until 1999 were prepared in 
accordance with ESA 79 accounting rules, from March 2000 onwards countries started 
to report their data according to ESA 95. As regards reporting deadlines, the fact that in 
the United Kingdom the fiscal year does not coincide with the calendar year implies a 
slightly different timing of data transmissions relative to the annual budget cycle
1. By 
means of sensitivity analysis we will go some way to ensure that our empirical findings 
are not distorted by these data peculiarities
2. 
 
In this paper we use data for the general government budget balance, interest 
expenditure and GFCF, all in ratios to GDP, from 1994 to 2006. Our sample includes 
the 15 countries belonging to the EU before the 2004 enlargement. Since issues of 
creative accounting are beyond the scope of our study, we do not explore the reported 
information on debt or on stock-flow adjustments (see Buti et al., 2006). Nor do we 
make use of data on sub-sectors’ balances, since the possibility of intra-annual transfers 




3. Statistical properties of EDP forecasts 
 
In this section we describe the statistical properties of forecast errors. For each of the 
three fiscal variables of interest (budget balance, interest payments and GFCF), the year 
t forecast error (et) is defined as the outturn (Rt) minus the forecast (Ft), both in 
percentage of the contemporary forecast or estimate of GDP. 
 
t t t F R e − =                                           (1) 
 
Hence, in the case of the budget balance, positive forecast errors mean a better-than-
projected budgetary execution, yielding a higher surplus (or a lower deficit). The 
opposite holds for interest payments and GFCF, where positive errors will signal 
higher-than-expected expenditure ratios, often associated to spending overruns. 
 
The outcome for year t is taken from the first notification of year t+1, submitted by 1 
April (formerly 1 March). The corresponding forecast is found in the first notification of 
year t. Measuring outcomes by first available estimates, as we do, fails to take into 
                                                 
1 The UK fiscal year goes from 1 April to 31 March. Forecasts in EDP notifications refer to fiscal or 
financial years – e.g. by 1 April 2007 the UK reported projected figures for the 2007/2008 financial year. 
Therefore the April reporting deadline coincides with the beginning (or end) of fiscal years, whereas for 
other countries there is a 3-month gap. 
2 Even controlling for the factors outlined in this paragraph, we do not claim to have achieved a perfectly 
homogeneous data set: other methodological changes exist (e.g. the recent move from base 1995 to base 
2000 in national accounts) and reporting dates are sometimes not fully uniform (for instance, we have 
retained corrections to the original data submitted on a few occasions by national governments shortly 
after the notification deadlines). We claim, however, to have improved on alternative datasets. 
3 account data revisions. On the other hand, working with definitive data would have 
reduced the number of available observations, and increased the likelihood of 
methodological divergences between forecasts and outturns. Further, first available 
estimates generally have more policy relevance than final, revised outturns, which is the 
most common argument for their widespread use in the literature (see e.g. Artis and 
Marcellino (2001) or Brück and Stephan (2006)). 
 
We compute three widely used summary statistics of forecast errors: the mean error 
(ME), the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean squared error (RMSE). We 
also test for unbiasedness and for autocorrelation. As is well known, biases correspond 
to cases of systematic overestimation or underestimation, whereas autocorrelation refers 
to systematic patterns of demeaned forecast errors over time (for example, the existence 
of some degree of persistence). The absence of both bias and autocorrelation is 
sometimes called “weak form informational efficiency” (henceforth weak efficiency; 
see Öller and Barot, 2000). 
 
Following the suggestion by Öller and Barot (2000), we test for both unbiasedness and 
autocorrelation by regressing forecast errors on a constant and as many lagged errors as 
needed for residuals to become a white noise
3. We thus estimate the following model: 
 
t t t t e e e μ λ λ β + + + = − − 2 2 1 1 0                                 (2)                             
 
Autocorrelation is tested through an F-test for  2 1 0 =λ = λ , and unbiasedness through a 
t-test for  . This latter test is performed after dropping unnecessary lags.  0 0 = β
 
 
Results for the budget balance are shown in Table 1. Although prudent forecasts largely 
outnumber optimistic ones, one observes considerable heterogeneity across countries. 
Five out of 15 member states (Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK) present 
negative mean errors, implying that outturns are, on average, worse than projected. At 
the opposite end, also five countries have positive mean errors which exceed 0.5 p.p of 
GDP - Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 
 
As regards forecasting accuracy, measured by the MAE or the RMSE, there is also 
sizeable cross-country variation. Belgium and Spain are the best performers, with 
average absolute errors of only 0.28 and 0.39 p.p. of GDP, respectively. By contrast, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden have MAE values higher than 1 p.p. In this 
latter group of countries, however, the apparent common lack of forecasting precision 
hides different situations: in the northern trio, high absolute errors mainly reflect the 
prevalence of large positive errors, the figures for the ME and MAE being relatively 
close (especially for Luxembourg); whereas in Greece the contrasting ME and MAE 
values are due to an unstable forecasting performance, with large errors of opposite 
signs.   
 
                                                 
3 This avoids the problem of invalid inference on the constant due to autocorrelated residuals. Adding one 
or two lags proved sufficient. 
4 The two final columns of Table 1 suggest a rather poor statistical quality of budget 
balance forecasts
4. Autocorrelation is detected in three countries and a significant bias 
in six; altogether, only four countries meet the requirements for weakly efficient 
forecasts, as defined above – Denmark, Germany, Austria and Portugal. Nevertheless, it 
is hard to draw normative implications from these results, since biased forecasts have 
only been found in countries which are either very prudent in their fiscal projections 





ME MAE RMSE No. Obs
Belgium 0.19 0.28 0.37 13 2.08 * 0.36
Denmark 0.42 0.71 0.98 13 1.65 0.69
Germany 0.05 0.88 1.07 13 0.15 0.27
Greece -0.41 1.05 1.42 13 -0.89 3.83 *
Spain 0.29 0.39 0.49 13 2.47 ** 0.15
France -0.23 0.41 0.57 13 -1.21 6.94 **
Ireland 1.18 1.68 1.94 13 2.64 ** 0.02
Italy -0.40 0.78 0.92 12
Luxembourg 1.18 1.28 1.54 13 4.10 *** 0.73
Netherlands 0.51 0.98 1.17 13 1.71 9.39 ***
Austria 0.10 0.51 0.64 12 0.53 0.45
Portugal -0.19 0.68 1.04 13 -0.64 0.79
Finland 0.61 0.83 1.13 12 2.12 * 1.94
Sweden 1.05 1.32 1.43 12 3.59 *** 1.71
United Kingdom -0.22 0.67 0.76 11
Notes: ME, MAE and RMSE are the mean, mean absolute and root mean squared errors, respectively. "No bias" is
the t-statistic for zero mean forecast errors (β0=0 in eq. 2 with unnecessary lags excluded). "No corr" reports the F-
statistic for the null hypothesis that λ1= λ2=0 in eq. (2). (*), (**) and (***) denote rejection of H0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance, respectively. Test statistics are not reported for countries which present missing values in
intermediate years, as the number of observations to test for autocorrelation is significantly reduced. 
No bias No corr
--
--
Table 1. Statistical properties of general government budget balance forecast 
errors (in % of GDP)
 
 
Results for GFCF forecast errors (Table 2) are in sharp contrast with those for the 
budget balance.  With the exception of Luxembourg and (to a lesser extent) Portugal, 
mean errors tend to be very small. Though on average most countries tend to err on the 
side of prudence (in the sense that the actual expenditure ratio turns out lower than 
forecast), this behaviour is seldom systematic: MAE figures are generally high 
compared to mean errors, indicating that errors often switch in sign. More formally, a 
significant bias is only detected for three countries (Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland). 
There are no instances of significant autocorrelation in forecast errors. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Statistical results should be regarded with prudence, as the number of observations is limited. When 
missing values in intermediate years induced an even smaller sample, the tests were not performed. 
5 For a given average error, a higher volatility makes it less likely that the null of no bias is rejected. 
5 ME MAE RMSE No. Obs
Belgium -0.01 0.12 0.15 12 -0.33 0.09
Denmark -0.04 0.13 0.16 13 -0.85 0.42
Germany -0.05 0.11 0.14 13 -1.44 0.99
Greece -0.15 0.28 0.36 10
Spain 0.02 0.19 0.22 12 0.23 1.83
France -0.03 0.18 0.20 13 -0.52 1.60
Ireland -0.03 0.24 0.28 13 -0.31 0.12
Italy 0.05 0.26 0.35 9
Luxembourg -0.47 0.59 0.75 13 -2.81 ** 1.82
Netherlands 0.04 0.20 0.27 13 0.68 2.32
Austria -0.11 0.20 0.24 12 -1.66 1.06
Portugal -0.22 0.38 0.46 13 -1.93 * 0.05
Finland 0.11 0.13 0.18 12 2.43 ** 1.88
Sweden -0.03 0.27 0.35 12 -0.28 0.06
United Kingdom -0.07 0.16 0.18 11
See notes under Table 1.
No bias No corr







As regards interest payments (Table 3), the mean error is negative for all 15 countries, 
and often close (with switched sign) to the mean absolute error, suggesting that the 
overestimation of this budget item has been systematic. One possible explanation for 
this pattern is that countries failed to fully anticipate the magnitude of the fall in interest 
rates during the run-up to EMU. Formal tests point to a statistically significant 
pessimistic bias in roughly half the member states considered. As in the case of GFCF, 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is never rejected. 
 
ME MAE RMSE No. Obs
Belgium -0.08 0.16 0.21 13 -1.56 1.43
Denmark -0.08 0.16 0.24 13 -1.21 1.41
Germany -0.04 0.19 0.30 13 -0.46 0.03
Greece -0.55 0.60 0.72 11
Spain -0.26 0.27 0.33 12 -4.35 *** 1.36
France -0.04 0.10 0.13 13 -1.11 0.91
Ireland -0.33 0.33 0.39 13 -5.25 *** 0.49
Italy -0.26 0.30 0.37 11
Luxembourg -0.01 0.05 0.05 13 -0.66 0.01
Netherlands -0.05 0.11 0.16 13 -1.14 0.00
Austria -0.07 0.12 0.16 12 -1.80 * 0.41
Portugal -0.12 0.16 0.20 13 -2.56 ** 0.78
Finland -0.17 0.29 0.41 11
Sweden -0.35 0.47 0.52 12 -3.00 ** 0.23
United Kingdom -0.04 0.11 0.13 11
See notes under Table 1.
-
-
Table 3. Statistical properties of interest expenditure forecast errors (in % of GDP)
--






Overall, we conclude that from a statistical point of view the quality of forecasts is 
worse for the budget balance than it is for interest and GFCF expenditure. Further, the 
degree of cross-country heterogeneity is much bigger as regards the budget balance 
projections. Finally, it is interesting to remark that even in the case of countries with 
negative average budget balance forecast errors, interest payments and GFCF spending 
6 tend to be projected with prudence
6, and thus the source of budget balance slippages is 
to be found elsewhere. 
 
 
4. Modelling Forecast Errors 
 
4.1. Methodology and explanatory variables 
 
In this section our goal is to find out which economic, political and institutional 
variables play a role in explaining fiscal forecast errors – as regards both the general 
government budget balance and two specific expenditure items, interest payments and 




it j j it X e ε β α + + = ∑ , ,                                  (3) 
where eit is the relevant forecast error (defined as in section 3), Xj,it denotes the potential 
determinants of errors, α and βj are parameters, t, i and j index years, countries and 
regressors, respectively, and the disturbance εit may contain an unobserved country 
effect. 
 
As in existing studies, the choice of regressors is mainly guided by the political 
economy literature applied to fiscal policy. Without claiming to encompass previous 
contributions, we have attempted to control for the factors they highlighted, as well as 
to test new variables, either constructed for the first time or borrowed from recent 
datasets.   
 
Our regressors fall into five different categories
7. First, economic controls include the 
output gap and the forecast error in real GDP growth. The former, intended to control 
for the possibility of greater optimism in good times (as detected by Strauch et al., 
2004), is computed according to two different methods: the Hodrick-Prescott filter and 
the production function approach. It is taken with a lag so as to capture cyclical 
conditions (roughly) at the time of preparing the fiscal forecasts. GDP forecast errors – 
perhaps the most obvious variable to control for, due to the operation of automatic 
stabilizers – were defined bearing in mind two concerns. The first was to align as 
closely as possible the timing of GDP forecasts and outturns with that of the fiscal 
variables. The second was to minimize problems of endogeneity by resorting to a 
forecaster not involved in the preparation of the EDP notifications
8. We have thus opted 
for the European Commission Spring forecasts, using projections from the previous 
Autumn for robustness checks. 
 
                                                 
6 With very minor exceptions in the case of Spanish and Italian GFCF – see Table 2. 
7 The Data Appendix provides a more detailed description of each variable. 
8 There would be endogeneity if in some circumstances governments decided to manipulate both GDP 
and deficit forecasts by assuming a rosy macroeconomic outlook, which in turn would translate into 
overoptimistic projections for tax revenues. Analysing variables net of cyclical factors, Jonung and Larch 
(2006) provide evidence that a similar behaviour has indeed prevailed in some of the largest EU 
countries.    
7 A second category of variables addresses the possible impact of fiscal rules and 
institutions. As in previous studies – e.g. Strauch et al. (2004), Annett (2006) – we 
account for different forms of fiscal governance (Hallerberg, 2004), creating indicator 
variables for the commitment, delegation and mixed forms of budget process 
centralization, as well as for cases of fragmented fiscal decision-making (variable 
fiefdom). Following standard practice, we also define a dummy variable that groups 
together commitment and mixed systems. An innovative feature of our study is the 
assessment of the influence of national-level numerical fiscal rules on forecasting 
performance. For this purpose we have resorted to a set of indices described in Ayuso et 
al. (2007), which quantify the coverage and strength of national numerical fiscal rules in 
EU countries from 1990 to 2005
9. We consider an index comprising numerical rules of 
different types (budget balance, debt, expenditure and revenue rules – variable 
numerical rules), as well as indices that restrict attention to expenditure rules or to 
budget balance and debt rules. All indices are increasing in the degree of coverage and 
strength.  
 
A third category includes variables attempting to capture political motivations of an 
opportunistic nature. Here, we follow previous studies (Strauch et al. (2004), Brück and 
Stephan (2006)) in considering how close the next general elections are, either by means 
of a dummy variable indicating if elections are expected in the current calendar year, or 
through a continuous variable measuring the expected time (in months) until the next 
elections. A refinement we introduce is that in both cases we consider the expected 
situation at the time of reporting the fiscal forecasts. Further, we construct a new 
dummy variable (previous opposition reports outturn) for situations where a forecast 
and the respective outturn are reported by governments controlled by opposing parties. 
This indicator attempts to control for the incentive that a new government may have to 
discredit its predecessor (of a different political family) and enhance its own fiscal 
performance by reporting for the previous year a “bad” fiscal outturn. 
 
The fourth group of regressors intends to control for the possible effects that an ongoing 
or imminent excessive deficit procedure may have on the forecasts of the country 
concerned. We define an indicator variable (ongoing EDP) for the cases where a 
country is already in excessive deficit at the time of forecasting, and a slightly enlarged 
variant (ongoing or run-up to EDP) also comprising instances where the declaration of 
an excessive deficit is to take place in the near future.  
 
A final category of regressors concerns the government’s strength, fragmentation and 
ideology. We use indicator variables for coalition and for minority governments, and a 
variable coding the ideological position of the executive on a 1 to 5 scale (increasing 
from right-wing to left-wing parties). These three variables were compiled in such a 
way as to reflect the situation prevailing at the time of forecasting. 
 
We estimate equation (3) by pooled OLS with clustered robust standard errors
10. 
Variables such as the forms of fiscal governance display little variation over time, in 
                                                 
9  Coverage refers to the share of public finances governed by the rules, whereas strength is assessed with 
reference to the rules’ statutory basis, monitoring and enforcement provisions and media visibility. We 
thank Ayuso and co-authors for sharing with us the time series for the indices. 
10  Estimations were performed using  Stata, version 9.2. 
8 which case fixed effects (FE) estimates are often imprecise (as noted by Strauch et al. 
(2004) and Annett (2006)). In turn, the random effects (RE) estimator requires more 
restrictive assumptions than pooled OLS with robust estimation of standard errors. We 
have checked, however, that using the FE or RE estimators broadly confirms the results 
obtained by pooled OLS. The use of clustered robust standard errors allows for the 
existence of heteroskedasticity across countries (suggested by the strong cross-country 
heterogeneity as regards the RMSE of forecast errors) and of serial correlation of 
unspecified form of disturbances within countries.  
 
 
4.2. Results for the budget balance 
 
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 report results for the whole sample of forecast errors 
(1994 to 2006). As expected, positive growth surprises induce better than projected 
fiscal balances, by an amount broadly in line with standard estimates of the size of 
automatic stabilisers. As in Strauch et al. (2004) or Annett (2006), we also find that 
fiscal governance characterised by commitment or mixed forms is strongly associated to 
more prudent budgetary forecasts
11. However, unlike those studies, our results do not 
support the hypothesis that a positive output gap imparts a significant optimistic bias to 
fiscal projections. 
 
Opportunistic motivations seem to play a role as well. Though in column (1) elections 
in the near future do not exert a statistically significant impact, it is the case that a new 
government dominated by a party previously in opposition is often associated to the 
disclosure of a worse-than-forecast fiscal performance under its predecessor. Further, if 
one ceases to control for the latter effect (column (2)), then elections regain 
significance, making governments err on the side of optimism, as in Brück and Stephan 
(2006). Our interpretation of these results is that electoral effects on forecast errors 
prove strongest when incumbents lose and are replaced in office by their opponents
12. 
 
Further, as regards the existence or prospect of an excessive deficit, results suggest that 
countries have tended to underestimate deficits in the run-up to the declaration of an 
excessive deficit; once it has been declared, however, the effect vanishes (column (3)). 
Finally, and unlike the results in Brück and Stephan (2006), coalition or minority 
governments do not seem to issue overly optimistic forecasts to any significant degree; 
likewise, the left-right position of a government appears irrelevant to its forecast 
performance
13. 
                                                 
11  An alternative would be to enter into the equation three of the fiscal governance indicator variables, 
thus assessing their effects against the fourth. Doing so reveals that commitment and mixed forms have 
significant and similar coefficients (the equality of which cannot be rejected) measured against 
delegation, whereas fiefdom lies far from statistical significance (results available upon request). We have 
hence decided to assimilate mixed systems to the commitment form of governance, as often done in the 
literature. 
12 With a few exceptions (e.g. unexpected elections or change of government without elections being 
called), variable previous opposition reports outturn takes value one in a subset of the observations where 
variable election in current year equals one.  
13  As mentioned before, we have also considered variants for some of the regressors – such as the output 
gap, the forecast error in real GDP growth or the proximity of elections. Results available upon request 
show that the above conclusions are robust to the use of such variants.  
9  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.35***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.57*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.33** 0.54*** 0.31*







-0.19 -0.38*** -0.16 -0.27 -0.25 -0.27
(0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
-0.49** -0.54* -0.24 -0.32 -0.25
(0.22) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
-0.39* -0.44* -0.75** -0.61* -0.77**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
-0.02
(0.18)
-0.003 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.002 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.11
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19)
0.05 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20)
R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.37
No. Observations 187 187 187 172 172 172
GDP forecast error (Spring)
Output gap (HP) (lagged)
Commitment or mixed







Balance or debt rules
Notes: Robust standard deviations are reported in brackets. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the estimated coefficients
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
Table 4. Modelling budget balance forecast errors
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Without numerical rules With numerical rules Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
Minority
Election in current year





Next – columns (4) to (6) – we add indices of national-level numerical fiscal rules to the 
previous equations (the sample becomes slightly smaller as these indices are only 
available up to 2005). Expenditure rules are found to be associated to more prudent 
forecasts, whereas deficit or debt rules fail to exert any noticeable impact
14. A possible 
explanation is that stronger expenditure rules help prevent spending overruns, which in 
turn play a major role in accounting for worse-than-expected deficit outcomes. Though 
our dataset does not disaggregate the budget balance into revenues and expenditures, 
                                                 
14 Results for the index of numerical rules of all types are similar to those obtained with the index of 
expenditure rules. 
10 Moulin and Wierts (2006) and the European Commission (2007) find that spending 
overruns (in nominal and real terms) are indeed the main explanation for the failure to 
achieve the planned improvements in the budget balance set out by Member States in 
their SCPs. 
 
Further, we have checked whether the impact of expenditure rules on forecast errors 
was significantly affected by the type of fiscal governance in place
15. Results in column 
(6) suggest that those rules foster prudent projections regardless of the form of fiscal 
governance, as the coefficient of the expenditure rules index interacted with the 









0.42*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
0.55*** 0.27 0.78*** 0.35*** 0.10 0.56***
(0.11) (0.16) (0.20) (0.11) (0.20) (0.17)
0.18** 0.20 0.18**
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
-0.58*** -0.04 -1.16*** -0.41** 0.06 -1.07***
(0.16) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26)
-0.39* -0.20 -0.73** -0.52*
(0.20) (0.16) (0.32) (0.28)
R-squared 0.33 0.34
No. Observations 189 174





Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn minus 
forecast)
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
Ongoing or run-up to EDP
Table 5. Modelling budget balance forecast errors - pre-SGP vs. SGP periods
Method of estimation - Pooled OLS
Expenditure rules








Table 5 reruns in a more parsimonious way the “baseline” specifications of Table 4 – 
columns (1) and (4), discarding non-significant variables – allowing for different 
coefficients before and after the coming into force of the SGP (1999)
16. It is noteworthy 
that the numerical and/or statistical significance of fiscal institutions (especially as 
regards the forms of fiscal governance) is much stronger in the SGP period. Similarly, 
opportunistic effects become apparent only from 1999 onwards, in line with Brück and 
Stephan’s (2006) detection of an electoral effect in Euro area countries after the 
introduction of the SGP. Similar results (available upon request) are obtained if the SGP 
subsample is further restricted to euro area countries (subject to the most stringent 
provisions of the EDP, such as the possibility of pecuniary sanctions). These findings 
suggest that the increased importance and visibility of fiscal forecasts in the SGP period 
made them more vulnerable to political manipulation; in turn, in a context of heightened 
                                                 
15 Hallerberg et al. (2007) consider a related question when analyzing the impact of fiscal institutions on 
public debt, and find that fiscal targets/rules tend to be a more efficient device in “commitment” countries 
(characterized by large ideological distance and high political competition among parties in government).  
16 The intercept (not reported) is also allowed to vary, whereas the excessive deficits dummy only takes 
non-zero values in the SGP subsample. 
11 political pressures, the quality of fiscal institutions has also become more influential in 
forecasting performance.     
 
The annex shows that the main conclusions above survive a set of robustness checks. 
These comprise (i) excluding the forecast errors affected by the move from ESA79 to 
ESA95 (i.e., those referring to 1999, with forecasts under ESA79 rules and outturns 
reported by 1 March 2000 according to the ESA95); (ii) excluding the UK observations, 
since its different fiscal year implies that the timing of forecasts and outturns relative to 
the annual budget cycle is not the same for the UK and for the remaining countries; (iii) 
estimating fixed effects and random effects models instead of using pooled OLS
17. 
 
   
4.3. Results for GFCF and interest expenditure 
 
After analyzing which political and institutional factors help explain the general 
government budget balance forecast errors, we turn our attention to forecasts of two 
important (though much less media exposed) expenditure items – GFCF and interest 
expenditure. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an exercise is done, 
taking advantage of the possibilities offered by our dataset. We wish to investigate 
whether the same variables that exert an impact on the overall balance projections also 
influence the pattern of forecast errors of more disaggregated items. 
 
Starting with GFCF, column (1) in Table 6 reruns the same specification already used in 
column (1) of Table 4. Nevertheless, conclusions are far from similar, as none of the 
regressors is significant. If we specify all individual forms of fiscal governance (instead 
of grouping together mixed and commitment systems), we find that countries 
characterized by fragmented fiscal decision-making are more prone to over-estimate 
GFCF spending (columns (2) and (3)). Though this could reflect a prudent budgetary 
execution, we tend to favour a different interpretation: faced with many competing 
demands and in the absence of a sound fiscal process, governments may feel pressured 
to announce large amounts of public investment, only part of which actually 
materialises. The prospect of elections in the near future also plays a role, being 
somewhat associated to modest spending overruns. Though understandable from a 
political economy perspective, this effect loses statistical significance when the 
proximity of elections is measured in a different way (variable months until next 
election, column (3)). 
 
As regards the role of the various types of numerical fiscal rules, conclusions are also 
very different from those of the previous section, as their coefficients are never 
significant – columns (4) to (6). The explanatory power of fragmented fiscal processes 
is preserved, and there are some signs of GFCF overruns in the run-up to the declaration 
of an excessive deficit (columns (4) and (5)), which cease to be significant once that 
declaration has taken place (column (6)). 
 
                                                 
17 In the case of fixed effects, the main differences, as expected, concern the coefficients of variables with 
little variation over time. 
12 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.004 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.005 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.07 -0.08 -0.003 -0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
-0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.20***







0.06 0.06* 0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.16** 0.18**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
0.12
(0.10)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
0.10 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10
No. Observations 180 180 180 166 166 166
See notes under Table 4.
Table 6. Modelling GFCF forecast errors
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Dep. Variable: GFCF forecast error (% 
GDP, outturn minus forecast)
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
GDP forecast error (Spring)






Balance or debt rules
Election in current year
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
On-going or run-up to EDP








Results for interest payments forecast errors are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) to (3) 
display specifications similar to those used for the budget balance. However, in contrast 
to Table 4, significant variables are few and hard to interpret. The run-up to an 
excessive deficit seems associated to overestimation – i.e., lower interest payments in % 
of GDP than forecast. The same happens with positive growth surprises, though in this 






-0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -1.59*** -1.56*** -2.84*** -0.99** -1.50***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.42) (0.42) (0.78) (0.35) (0.46)
0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.64* -0.64** -0.85** -0.42 -0.71**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.27) (0.38) (0.40) (0.33)
0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -1.16 -1.39* -0.01 -2.26 -1.96**





0.13 0.13 0.14 2.44 2.03* 1.09 2.48 2.10*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (1.41) (1.10) (1.25) (1.42) (1.17)
0.005 0.01 -0.005 -1.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (1.38)
-0.08*** -0.13*** -0.77 -0.87 -1.17 -1.27
(0.03) (0.04) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (1.45)
-0.07
(0.04)
0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.32)
0.15 0.13 0.15 2.08* 2.45** 2.12* 2.94** 2.66**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (1.00) (0.89) (1.11) (1.37) (1.13)
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.81
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.97)
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.27 0.27
No. Observations 183 168 183 182 183 168
Time Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Normalized forecast errors No No No Yes Yes Yes
See notes under Table 4.
Table 7. Modelling interest payments forecast errors
Ongoing EDP
Dep. Variable: interest payments 
forecast error (cols. 1 to 3: % GDP, 
outturn minus forecast; cols. 4 to 7: 
see text)
GDP forecast error (Spring)
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
On-going or run-up to EDP
Output gap (HP) (lagged)
Commitment or mixed
Expenditure rules
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Yes










Balance or debt rules




In the remainder of the table the equations are altered in two ways. First, we introduce 
year dummies
19, to capture developments in interest rates that are largely common to 
the several countries. Second, we normalize the dependent variable by taking the ratio 
of interest expenditure forecast errors to the realized gross debt in the previous year 
(both in % of GDP of the respective year), thus eliminating the relative forecasting 
disadvantage of more indebted countries (for the same degree of uncertainty 
                                                 
18 If in a country interest payments stand at 3% of GDP (a value often exceeded, especially in the early 
years of the sample), the forecast error in nominal terms is zero and there is a positive growth surprise of 
1 p.p., then the forecast error in % of GDP will be -0.03, which compares with an estimated coefficient of 
-0,05.  
19 Coefficients for the year dummies are available upon request. 
14 surrounding interest rates, a high-debt country will tend to record larger absolute errors 
in the interest-to-GDP ratio than a low-debt one)
20. 
 
While column (4) retains all the regressors of column (1), columns (5) to (7) drop the 
three least significant variables. A positive output gap is associated to prudent forecasts, 
the opposite taking place with coalition governments. Commitment or mixed forms of 
fiscal governance seem to foster prudence, while the prospect of elections in the current 
year induces spending overruns – results reminiscent of those obtained for the budget 
balance, though much less robust, and failing to reach statistical significance when one 
allows for different coefficients before and after the SGP (column (6)). Numerical rules 
remain of negligible relevance, as it was the case in column (2). Overall, adding time 
effects and dividing errors by public debt brings us only marginally closer to the 
conclusions drawn when modeling budget balance forecast errors
21. 
 
In sum, it is much harder to find systematic relationships between forecast errors and 
politico-institutional variables in the case of interest and GFCF spending than it is for 
the overall budget balance. This finding echoes the conclusions drawn in section 3, 
namely the better statistical quality of forecasts for the two disaggregated items. It is 
probably the case that their much lower profile reduces the importance of non-technical 





In this paper we have assessed fiscal forecasting in 15 EU countries by looking at 
budgetary projections contained in EDP notifications – a previously unexploited source 
with important advantages over alternatives. For three fiscal variables (the overall 
budget balance, GFCF and interest payments, all in ratios to GDP), we have 
documented the statistical properties of forecast errors and performed a panel data 
analysis of their potential determinants, considering a wide set of economic, political 
and institutional variables. 
 
Budget balance forecast errors respond to growth surprises due to the operation of 
automatic stabilisers, and tend to be positive (i.e. with outcomes better than projections) 
when fiscal governance takes the commitment or mixed forms. A higher coverage and 
strength of national-level expenditure rules is also conducive to more prudent forecasts, 
both for commitment/mixed systems and for other forms of fiscal governance. Two 
sorts of opportunistic considerations also exert some impact on forecast errors. First, 
upcoming elections are associated to forecasts that turn too rosy, especially when the 
ensuing outcomes are reported by the former opposition. Second, countries have also 
tended to be over-optimistic in the run-up to the declaration of an excessive deficit, 
though this result must be regarded with prudence due to the very small number of 
observations. Both the effect of fiscal rules and institutions and that of opportunistic 
                                                 
20 For readability of the estimated coefficients, the ensuing dependent variable is then multiplied by 1000. 
21 For both GFCF and interest payments equations were also estimated with FE and RE. Results 
(available upon request) broadly confirm those above, the main differences pertaining to variables with 
little variation over time in FE models. 
15 political motivations have become stronger once the SGP has come into force. Finally, 
the coalition or minority nature of a government, its partisanship, the output gap 
estimates at the time of forecasting and the reliance on national-level deficit or debt 
rules all fail to exert any significant influence. 
 
We have next asked whether the above results for the budget balance forecasts also held 
in the case of GFCF and interest payments projections, and found a generally negative 
answer. Systematic relationships between interest or GFCF expenditure forecast errors 
and politico-institutional variables are scarcer and less robust. There tends to be GFCF 
overestimation when fiscal decision-making is fragmented, which might correspond to 
governments being pressured by interest groups to announce large amounts of public 
investment, only part of which actually materialises. In the case of interest payments, 
some specifications detect an influence of fiscal governance forms and of electoral 
effects which is coherent with the results for the budget balance, but statistically fragile. 
To some extent, these conclusions match those from the univariate analyses of forecast 
errors, which showed fewer systematic patterns for interest payments and GFCF than 
for the budget balance
22. 
 
The whole of our analysis suggests that the influence of political and institutional 
variables on fiscal forecasting strongly increases with the public visibility and policy 
relevance of such forecasts. A clear illustration is provided by the contrasting results for 
the budget balance before the SGP, GFCF and interest expenditure, on the one hand, 
and for the budget balance under the SGP, on the other. The higher the profile of 
forecasts, the stronger the political pressures are likely to become, and the greater the 
importance of sound fiscal rules and institutions in delivering a prudent assessment of 
the fiscal outlook. 
 
 
                                                 
22  With the exception of a generalized overestimation of interest expenditure – see section 3. 
16   17
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
0.61*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.38** 0.58*** 0.37*







Table 4A. Modelling budget balance forecast errors: excluding 1999 forecast errors due to 
ESA change. Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
DP forecast error (Spring)





Balance or debt rules
Election in current year
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
Minority
























-0.18 -0.39** -0.15 -0.29 -0.25 -0.30
(0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
-0.50* -0.55* -0.24 -0.32 -0.24
(0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25)
-0.37* -0.41* -0.72** -0.59* -0.74**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32)
0.01
(0.18)
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.14
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.24) (0.21)
0.07 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.10
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22)
0.33 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.35
tions 173 173 173 158 158 158






0.41*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.31***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
0.58*** 0.27 0.87*** 0.41*** 0.10 0.69***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.23) (0.13) (0.20) (0.23)
0.16* 0.20 0.14
(0.08) (0.14) (0.11)
-0.58*** -0.04 -1.22*** -0.41** 0.06 -1.16***
(0.17) (0.24) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.27)
-0.37* -0.13 -0.70** -0.42
(0.20) (0.18) (0.32) (0.28)
R-squared 0.32 0.33
No. Observations 175 160
See notes under Table 4.
Table 5A. Modelling budget balance forecast errors - pre-SGP vs. SGP periods - excluding 1999 forecast errors due to 
ESA change. Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Equation 1 Equation 2
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn minus 
forecast)
GDP forecast error (Spring)





Previous opposition reports 
outturn
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
0.56*** 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.33** 0.52*** 0.32*








Table 4B. Modelling budget balance forecast errors: excluding the United Kingdom
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
P forecast error (Spring)





Balance or debt rules
Election in current year
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
Minority





















-0.21 -0.44*** -0.17 -0.30 -0.27 -0.30
(0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
-0.58** -0.64** -0.33 -0.41* -0.34
(0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
-0.43** -0.49** -0.76** -0.63** -0.78**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30)
-0.06
(0.19)
-0.01 0.003 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23)
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.07
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22)
ed 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.37
bservations 176 176 176 162 162 162






0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
0.52*** 0.25 0.72*** 0.34*** 0.10 0.52***
(0.11) (0.18) (0.21) (0.11) (0.22) (0.17)
0.17** 0.18 0.17*
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
-0.67*** -0.14 -1.17*** -0.51*** -0.03 -1.09***
(0.14) (0.24) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.25)
-0.43** -0.27 -0.74** -0.56*
(0.20) (0.16) (0.31) (0.27)
R-squared 0.33 0.34
No. Observations 178 164
See notes under Table 4.
Table 5B. Modelling budget balance forecast errors - pre-SGP vs. SGP periods - excluding the United Kingdom
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS
Equation 1 Equation 2
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
GDP forecast error (Spring)





Previous opposition reports 
outturn
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
0.54*** 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.27 0.48*** 0.24








Table 4C. Modelling budget balance forecast errors
Method of estimation: Random Effects
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
P forecast error (Spring)





Balance or debt rules
Election in current year
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
Minority




















-0.20 -0.39*** -0.17 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28
(0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
-0.49** -0.54** -0.24 -0.31 -0.25
(0.23) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
-0.41** -0.45** -0.74** -0.65** -0.76**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
-0.03
(0.18)
-0.004 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.003 -0.12
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23)
-0.0003 0.004 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
ll R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.37
bservations 187 187 187 172 172 172






0.42*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
0.54*** 0.24 0.75*** 0.35*** 0.10 0.56***
(0.11) (0.17) (0.20) (0.11) (0.20) (0.17)
0.18*** 0.20 0.18**
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
-0.58*** -0.04 -1.16*** -0.41** 0.06 -1.07***
(0.16) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26)
-0.39** -0.20 -0.73** -0.52*
(0.20) (0.16) (0.32) (0.28)
Overall R-squared 0.33 0.34
No. Observations 189 174
See notes under Table 4.
Table 5C. Modelling budget balance forecast errors - pre-SGP vs. SGP periods
Method of estimation - Random Effects
0.36 0.38
Dep. Variable: budget balance forecast 
error (% GDP, outturn minus forecast)
Ongoing or run-up to EDP
GDP forecast error (Spring)
Commitment or mixed
Expenditure rules
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
189 174
Equation 1 Equation 2
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
  22
   23
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.36*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 -0.02 -0.26








Table 4D. Modelling budget balance forecast errors
Method of estimation: Fixed Effects
Dep. Variable: budget balance 
forecast error (% GDP, outturn 
minus forecast)
Without numerical rules With numerical rules
DP forecast error (Spring)





Balance or debt rules
Election in current year
Previous opposition reports 
outturn
Minority

















-0.23 -0.42*** -0.21 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
-0.47* -0.49* -0.24 -0.30 -0.25
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
-0.29 -0.32 -0.59 -0.56 -0.62*
(0.19) (0.22) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34)
0.12
(0.25)
0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
-0.96** -1.02** -1.20*** -0.58 -0.65 -0.58
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54)
-0.20 -0.17 -0.17 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.44) (0.46) (0.45)
ll R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.23
bservations 187 187 187 172 172 172






0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.33***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08)
-0.18 -0.47* -0.04 -0.15 -0.59** -0.18
(0.10) (0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26)
0.12 0.25 0.31*
(0.07) (0.15) (0.16)
-0.58*** -0.001 -1.18*** -0.42** 0.08 -1.09***
(0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.25)
-0.37* -0.13 -0.67* -0.42
(0.21) (0.14) (0.34) (0.25)
Overall R-squared 0.21 0.27
No. Observations 189 174
See notes under Table 4.
Table 5D. Modelling budget balance forecast errors - pre-SGP vs. SGP periods
Method of estimation - Fixed Effects
0.22 0.29
Dep. Variable: budget balance forecast 
error (% GDP, outturn minus forecast)
Ongoing or run-up to EDP
GDP forecast error (Spring)
Commitment or mixed
Expenditure rules
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balance or debt rules – index of the coverage and strength of national-level numerical 
fiscal rules targeting the budget balance or public debt. Source: Ayuso et al. (2007); 
unpublished index, constructed along the lines of variables expenditure rules and 
numerical rules below, and kindly made available by the authors. See numerical rules 
below for more details. 
 
coalition – dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a coalition government in a country in 
a given year. Data refer to the type of government that was in office at the time of 
reporting the forecasts. Sources: Armingeon et al. (2006), variable coded as gov_type, 
until 2004. Data for 2005: European Journal of Political Research (2006), 45. Data for 
2006:  Parties and Elections in Europe, at www.parties-and-elections.de. The 1995/96 
caretaker government in Italy has been classified as a coalition government.  
 
commitment – dummy equal to 1 if a given country in a given year has a commitment 
form of fiscal governance. Sources: until 2004, Hallerberg (2004), complemented by 
Annett (2006, p. 6, Table 1); for 2005 and 2006, European Commission (2006, p. 156, 
Table III.3) and 2006 updates of SCPs. The institutional information for 2006 contained 
in the latter source did not suggest any change in classification relative to 2005 for the 
countries considered in our sample. Likewise, the classification of forms of fiscal 
governance given in European Commission (2006) did not point to any change relative 
to the situation in 2004 as presented in Annett’s table, with the exceptions of Portugal 
(classified in the European Commission publication as a delegation country) and Greece 
(omitted). In the Portuguese case, developments in fiscal institutions in 2005 do not 
seem enough to justify a departure from the 2004 classification, which was therefore 
extrapolated. The same criterion was applied to Greece. 
 
commitment or mixed – dummy equal to 1 if a given country in a given year has a 
commitment or mixed form of fiscal governance. Source: same as for commitment 
above. 
 
delegation – dummy equal to 1 if a given country in a given year has a delegation form 
of fiscal governance. Source: same as for commitment above. 
 
election in current year – dummy variable equal to 1 if a country held a legislative 
election in a given year after reporting the forecasts. Only expected elections at the time 
of reporting are considered. Source: Armingeon et al. (2006), until 2004. European 
Journal of Political Research (2006), 45 and Parties and Elections in Europe, at 
www.parties-and-elections.de for 2005 and 2006. In order to check if a given election 
was expected at the time of reporting, the European Journal of Political Research has 
been used. For example, in France, an election took place on June 1
st, 1997. However, at 
the time of the 1997 reporting, elections were not expected before 1998, as President 
Chirac announced the dissolution of the National Assembly only on April 21
st 
(European Journal of Political Research (1998), 34). Hence this dummy takes value zero 
for France in 1997. 
 
  25expenditure rules – index of the coverage and strength of national-level numerical fiscal 
rules targeting public expenditure. Source: Ayuso et al. (2007), where it is called 
“Expenditure Rule Index”. See numerical rules below for more details. 
 
fiefdom – dummy equal to 1 if a given country in a given year has a fragmented fiscal 
process, termed in Hallerberg (2004) a “fiefdom” form of fiscal governance. Source: 
same as for commitment above.  
 
GDP forecast error (Autumn) – GDP growth rate forecast error, corresponding to the 
first available estimate for the year t GDP growth rate (from the European Commission 
Spring Forecasts of year t+1) minus the forecast for year t included in the European 
Commission Autumn Forecasts of year t-1. Source: European Commission Autumn 
Forecasts, several issues. 
 
GDP forecast error (Average) – GDP growth rate forecast error, corresponding to the 
first available estimate for the year t GDP growth rate (from the European Commission 
Spring Forecasts of year t+1) minus the average forecast for year t (computed as the 
simple average of the forecasts included in the Spring Forecasts of year t and in the 
Autumn Forecasts of year t-1). Source: European Commission Spring Forecasts and 
Autumn Forecasts, several issues. 
 
GDP forecast error (Spring) – GDP growth rate forecast error, corresponding to the 
first available estimate for the year t GDP growth rate (from the European Commission 
Spring Forecasts of year t+1) minus the forecast for year t included in the European 
Commission Spring Forecasts of year t. Source: European Commission Spring 
Forecasts, several issues. 
 
ideology – cabinet composition (Schmidt index): (1) hegemony of right-wing parties (no 
social-democratic or other left parties represented); (2) dominance of right-wing (and 
centre) parties (social-democratic or other left parties representing less than 33.3% of 
the cabinet posts); (3) stand-off between left and right (social-democratic or other left 
parties with a proportion of cabinet posts between 33.3% and 66.6%); (4) dominance of 
social-democratic and other left parties (social-democratic and other left parties with 
more than 66.6% of the cabinet posts); (5) hegemony of social-democratic and other left 
parties (no right-wing and centre parties representation). Data refer to that type of 
government that was in office at the time of reporting the forecasts. Sources: 
Armingeon  et al. (2006), variable coded as govparty, until 2004. Data for 2005: 
European Journal of Political Research (2006), 45. Data for 2006:  Parties and Elections 
in Europe, at www.parties-and-elections.de. For recent years we have continued to 
adopt the ideological classification of each party proposed by the codebook of 
Armingeon  et al. (2006). The 1995/96 caretaker government in Italy has not been 
coded. 
 
minority – dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a minority government in a country in a 
given year. Data refer to that type of government that was in office at the time of 
reporting the forecasts. Sources: Armingeon et al. (2006), variable coded as gov_type, 
until 2004. Data for 2005: European Journal of Political Research (2006), 45. Data for 
26 2006:  Parties and Elections in Europe, at www.parties-and-elections.de. The 1995/96 
caretaker government in Italy has been classified as a minority government. 
 
mixed – dummy equal to 1 if a given country in a given year has a mixed form of fiscal 
governance. Source: Source: same as for commitment above. 
 
months until next election – number of months from the date of reporting the forecasts 
(defined as March 1 until 2005, April 1 afterwards) till the next legislative election 
(computed as the number of days till the next legislative election divided by 30, as in 
Brück and Stephan, 2006). Only expected elections at the time of reporting are 
considered. For elections not yet scheduled, we have admitted, in the absence of better 
information, that they will take place at the end of the legislature, on the same date (day 
and month) of the latest elections. Source: Armingeon et al. (2006), and Parties and 
Elections in Europe, at www.parties-and-elections.de and official electoral departments 
of each country for recent years.  
 
numerical rules – index of the coverage and strength of national-level numerical fiscal 
rules of all different types (budget balance, debt, expenditure and revenue rules). 
Source: Ayuso et al. (2007), where it is called “Fiscal Rule Index”. The original index 
omits Greece, since this country did not have any numerical rule in the period 
considered by the authors (1990-2005). Both in this case and as regards expenditure 
rules and balance or debt rules, we have included Greece by setting its value (constant 
in time) equal to the sample minimum (i.e., the smallest value observed in other 
countries, which was confirmed to correspond to an absence of rules). After including 
Greece the indices were renormalised (zero average and unit standard deviation). 
 
ongoing EDP – dummy equal to 1 if a country is under an ongoing excessive deficit 
procedure (with a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit having taken 
place) at the time of reporting the forecasts. Source: European Commission, Economic 
and Financial Affairs, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp_list_en.htm
 
ongoing or run-up to EDP – dummy equal to 1 if a country is or will be under an 
ongoing excessive deficit procedure (with a Council decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit having taken place) at the time of reporting the forecasts or at some 
future time in the same calendar year. Source: European Commission, Economic and 
Financial Affairs, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp_list_en.htm
 
output gap (HP) – output gap relative to trend DGP (deviation of actual output from 
trend output as a percentage of trend GDP; the latter is estimated through the Hodrick-
Prescott filter). Source: AMECO (Annual Macro Economic Database, European 
Commission), Spring 2007. 
 
output gap (production function) – output gap relative to potential GDP (deviation of 
actual output from potential output as a percentage of potential GDP; the latter is 
estimated through an aggregate production function). Source: AMECO, Spring 2007. 
 
27 previous opposition reports outturn – dummy equal to 1 if the following conditions are 
cumulatively verified: (i) the government that reports the first available estimate of the 
outturn (henceforth the new government) is different from the government that reported 
the respective forecast (henceforth the previous government); (ii) the dominant party of 
the new government (considering as dominant the party to which the Prime-Minister 
belongs) did not take part in the previous government; (ii) the dominant party of the 
previous government does not take part in the new government. Source: European 
Journal of Political Research, several issues, and Parties and Elections in Europe, at 
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